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Abstract
A small investor provides liquidity at the best bid and ask prices of a limit order market.
For small spreads and frequent orders of other market participants, we explicitly determine the
investor’s optimal policy and welfare. In doing so, we allow for general dynamics of the mid
price, the spread, and the order flow, as well as for arbitrary preferences of the liquidity provider
under consideration.
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1 Introduction
Trades on financial markets are instigated by various motives. For example, mutual funds rebalance
their portfolios, derivative positions are hedged, and margin calls may necessitate the liquidation
of large asset positions. Such trades require counterparties who provide the necessary liquidity to
the market. Traditionally, this market making role was played by designated “specialists”, who
agreed on contractual terms to match incoming orders in exchange for earning the spread between
their bid and ask prices. As stock markets have become automated, this quasi-monopolistic setup
has given way to limit order markets on many trading venues. Here, electronic limit order books
collect all incoming orders, and automatically pair matching buy and sell trades. Such limit order
markets allow virtually all market participants to engage in systematic liquidity provision, which
has become a popular algorithmic trading strategy for hedge funds.
The present study analyzes optimal strategies for liquidity provision and their performance. In
contrast to most previous work on market making, we do not consider a single large monopolistic
specialist (e.g., [10, 2, 15, 3, 12]) who optimally sets the bid-ask spread. Instead, as in [22, 6, 12, 14,
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27], we focus on a small liquidity provider who chooses how much liquidity to provide by placing
limit buy and sell orders at exogenously given bid and ask prices, respectively. For tractability, we
assume that limit orders of the liquidity provider are fully executed against any incoming market
order, and, by the above choice of the limit prices, her orders enjoy priority over limit orders
submitted by other market participants. Thereby, we abstract from incentives to place orders at
different limit prices, which leads to an enormous dimensionality reduction of the strategy space
that has to be considered. To wit, we do not have to model the whole order order book. Instead,
our model is fully specified by the bid-ask price processes and the arrival times of market orders
of other market participants. We assume that the mid-price of the risky asset follows a martingale
and consider the practically relevant limiting regime of small spreads and frequent orders of other
market participants. Thereby, we obtain explicit formulas in a general setting allowing for arbitrary
dynamics of the mid price, the spread, and the order flow, as well as for general preferences of the
liquidity provider under consideration.1
Given the liquidity provider’s risk aversion, the asset’s volatility, and the arrival rates of exoge-
nous orders, the model tells us how much liquidity to provide by placing limit orders. However,
our model abstracts from the precise microstructure of order books, in particular from the finite
price grid and the use of information about order volumes in the book. In this spirit, we work with
diffusion processes that are more tractable than integer-valued jump processes. Ignoring volume
effects, our model carries the flavor of the standard frictionless market model and models with
proportional transaction costs. Consequently, the model does not answer the question whether to
place, say, the limit buy order of optimal size exactly at the current best bid price or possibly one
tick above/below it.
In this setting, the optimal policy is determined by an upper and lower boundary for the
monetary position in the risky asset, to which the investor trades whenever an exogenous market
order of another market participant arrives. Hence, these target positions determine the amount
of liquidity the investor posts in the limit order book. Ku¨hn and Stroh [22] characterize these
boundaries by the solution of a free boundary problem for a log-investor with unit risk aversion,
who only keeps long positions in a market with constant order flow and bid-ask prices following
geometric Brownian motion with positive drift. In the present study, we show in a general setting
with a martingale mid price that – in the limit for small spreads and frequent orders of other market
participants – the upper and lower target positions are given explicitly by
βt =
2εtα
(2)
t
ARA(x0)σ2t
, β
t
= − 2εtα
(1)
t
ARA(x0)σ2t
. (1.1)
In these formulas, 2εt is the width of the relative bid-ask spread, α
(1)
t and α
(2)
t are the arrival rates
of market sell and buy orders of other market participants, σt is the volatility of the risky asset
returns, and ARA(x0) is the absolute risk aversion of the investor at her initial position x0. To
wit, the optimal amount of liquidity provided is inversely proportional to the inventory risk caused
by the asset’s local variance, scaled by the investor’s risk aversion. Conversely, liquidity provision
is proportional to the compensation per trade (i.e., the relative spread 2εt), and the arrival rates
α
(1)
t respectively α
(2)
t . The product of these two terms plays the role of the risky asset’s expected
returns in the usual Merton position, in that it describes the investor’s average revenues per unit
time, that are traded off against her risk aversion and the variance of the asset returns to determine
the optimal target position. Here, however, revenues are derived by netting other traders’ buy and
1Related results for models with small trading costs have recently been determined by [28, 24, 30, 21, 20]. These
correspond to optimal trading strategies for liquidity takers, whose demand is matched by liquidity providers such as
the ones considered here.
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sell orders, unlike for the classical Merton problem, where they are generated by participating in
trends of the risky asset. Note that the above policy is myopic, in that it only depends on the local
dynamics of the model; future variations are not taken into account at the leading order.
The performance of the above strategy can also be quantified. At the leading order, its certainty
equivalent is given by
x0 +
ARA(x0)
2
E
[∫ T
0
(β
2
t 1A(1)t
+ β2
t
1
A
(2)
t
)σ2t dt
]
, (1.2)
where ω ∈ A(1)t if the investor’s last trade before time t was a purchase so that her position is
close to the upper boundary βt. Likewise, ω ∈ A(2)t if the investor’s position is close to the lower
boundary β
t
after her last trade was a sale of the risky asset. Hence, the certainty equivalent of
providing liquidity in the limit order market is given by the average (with respect to states and
business time σ2t dt) of future squared target positions, rescaled by risk aversion.
2 If all model
parameters are constant, the above formula simplifies to
x0 +
(2εα(1))(2εα(2))
2ARA(x0)σ2
T.
In this case, liquidity provision is therefore equivalent at the leading order to an annuity proportional
to the “drift rates” 2εαi of the investor’s revenues from purchases respectively sales, divided by
two times the investor’s risk aversion, times the risky asset’s variance. In the symmetric case
α(1) = α(2) = α, this is in direct analogy to the corresponding result for the classical Merton
problem in the Black-Scholes model, where the equivalent annuity is given by the squared Sharpe
ratio divided by two times the investor’s risk aversion. For a given total order flow α(1) + α(2),
asymmetries α(1) 6= α(2) reduce liquidity providers’ certainty equivalents, since they reduce the
opportunities to earn the spread with little inventory risk by netting successive buy and sell trades.
Our model is an overly optimistic playground for liquidity providers. These do not incur moni-
toring costs and always achieve full execution of their limit orders without having to further narrow
the spread.3 Submission and deletion of orders is free. Moreover, since market orders of other mar-
ket participants do not move the current best bid or ask prices, they earn the full spread between
alternating buy and sell trades, only subject to the risk of intermediate price changes. This changes
substantially if market prices systematically rise respectively fall for purchases respectively sales
of other market participants, as acknowledged in the voluminous literature on price impact (e.g.,
[4, 1, 26]). These effects can stem, e.g., from adverse selection, as informed traders prey on the
liquidity providers [11], or from large incoming orders that eat into the order book [26]. Our model
can be extended to account for price impact of incoming orders equal to a fraction κ ∈ [0, 1) of the
half-spread.4 This extension is still tractable; indeed, the above formula (1.1) for the leading-order
optimal position limits generalizes to
βt =
2εt((1− κ2 )α
(2)
t − κ2α
(1)
t )
ARA(x0)σ2t
, β
t
= −2εt((1−
κ
2 )α
(1)
t − κ2α
(2)
t )
ARA(x0)σ2t
. (1.3)
2This is in direct analogy to the results for models with proportional transaction costs [20, Equation (3.4)]; since
the mid price follows a martingale in our model, the marginal pricing measure coincides with the physical probability
here.
3Partial execution of limit orders is studied by Guilbaud and Pham [13]. A model where liquidity providers have
to narrow the spread by a discrete “tick” to gain execution priority is analyzed in [14].
4If the price impact is almost the half-spread, this leads to a model similar to the one of Madhavan et al. [23].
3
For a symmetric order flow (α
(1)
t = α
(2)
t = αt), these formulas reduce to
βt =
2εt(1− κ)αt
ARA(x0)σ2t
, β
t
= −2εt(1− κ)αt
ARA(x0)σ2t
.
That is, liquidity provision is simply reduced by a factor of 1− κ in this case. Here, the intuition
is that, for κ ≈ 1, price impact almost neutralizes the proportional transaction cost εt the liquidity
provider earns per trade. Hence, market making becomes unprofitable in this case as dwindling
earnings are outweighed by inventory risk.
Even with price impact, the leading-order optimal certainty equivalent is still given by (1.2), if
one replaces the trading boundaries accordingly. Hence, liquidity providers’ profits shrink as they
reduce their position limits due to price impact. In view of the still optimistic assumptions, the
optimal strategy associated with (1.3) can at least serve as an upper bound (respectively a lower
bound if it takes a negative value) for a strategy to follow in practise. It can be computed explicitly
and is easy to interpret.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Our model is introduced in Section 2.
Subsequently, the main results of the paper are presented in Section 3, and proved in Section 4.
Finally, Section 5 extends the model to allow for price impact of incoming orders.
2 Model
2.1 Limit Order Market
We consider a financial market with one safe asset, normalized to one, and one risky asset, which
can be traded either by market orders or by limit orders. Market orders are executed immediately,
but purchases at time t are settled at a higher ask price (1 + εt)St, whereas sales only earn a lower
bid price (1 − εt)St.5 In contrast, limit orders can be put into the order book with an arbitrary
exercise price, but are only executed once a matching order of another market participant arrives.
Handling the complexity of limit orders with arbitrary exercise prices is a daunting task. To obtain
a tractable model, we therefore follow [22] in assuming that limit buy or sell orders can only be
placed at the current best bid or ask price, respectively. This can be justified as follows for small
investors, whose orders do not move market prices, and for continuous best bid and ask prices. In
this case, placing (and constantly updating) limit buy orders at a “marginally” higher price than
the current best-bid price (1− εt)St guarantees execution as soon as the next market sell order of
another trader arrives. For the sake of tractability, we abstract from the presence of a finite tick
size. Consequently, limit buy orders with a higher exercise price are executed at the same time but
at a higher cost, whereas, by continuity, exercise prices below the current best bid are only executed
later. This argument implicitly assumes that the incoming orders of other market participants are
liquidity-driven and small, so that they do not move market prices (we show how to relax this
assumption in Section 5). Moreover, the investor under consideration is even smaller, in that her
orders also don’t influence market prices and are executed immediately against any incoming order
of another market participant.6 These assumptions greatly reduce the complexity of the problem.
Yet, the model still retains the key tradeoff between making profits by providing liquidity, and the
inventory risk caused by the positions built up along the way.
Let us now formalize trading in this limit order market. All stochastic quantities are defined
on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ], P ) satisfying the usual conditions. Strategies
5That is, εt is the halfwidth of the relative bid-ask spread.
6Partial execution is studied by Guilbaud and Pham [13].
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are described by quadruples S = (MBt ,M
S
t , L
B
t , L
S
t )t∈[0,T ] of predictable processes. Here, the
nondecreasing processes MBt and M
S
t represent the investor’s cumulated market buy and sell orders
until time t, respectively. MBt and M
S
t possess left and right limits, but may have double jumps.
For a ca`dla`g process Yt and a process Mt of finite variation, the integral of Yt with respect to
Mt is defined as
∫ t
0
(Ys−, Ys) dMs :=
∫ t
0
Ys− dM rs +
∑
0≤s<t
Ys(Ms+ −Ms), (2.1)
where the integrator M rt := Mt −
∑
0≤s<t(Ms+ −Ms) is ca`dla`g, i.e., the first term on the right-
hand side of (2.1) is just a standard Lebesgue-Stieltjes integral, see also [22, Equation (2.2)]. For
continuous integrands Yt, we set∫ t
0
Ys dMs :=
∫ t
0
(Ys−, Ys) dMs. (2.2)
LBt (respectively L
S
t ) specifies the size of the limit buy order with limit price (1− εt)St (respec-
tively the limit sell order with limit price (1 + εt)St) in the book at time t, i.e., the amount that is
bought or sold if an exogenous market sell or buy order arrives at time t.7 Fix an initial position of
x0 units in the safe and x = 0 units in the risky asset. The number of risky assets, denoted by ϕt,
changes by market orders, and when limit buy or sell orders are executed at the jump times of some
counting processes N
(1)
t or N
(2)
t , respectively. At the jump times of N
(1)
t , the sell order of another
market participant arrives so that the risky position of the liquidity provider is increased according
to the number of corresponding limit orders in the book, and analogously for incoming buy orders
at the jump times of N
(2)
t . Market orders are executed at the less favorable side of the bid-ask
spread, whereas limit orders are matched against other traders’ orders at the more favorable side.
This leads to the following definition.
Definition 2.1. A pair (ϕ0t , ϕt)t∈[0,T ] specifying the number of monetary units and risky assets that
the investor holds is called a self-financing portfolio process iff it can be written as
ϕt = M
B
t −MSt +
∫ t−
0
LBs dN
(1)
s −
∫ t−
0
LSs dN
(2)
s (2.3)
and
ϕ0t = x0 −
∫ t
0
(1 + εs)Ss dM
B
s +
∫ t
0
(1− εs)Ss dMSs (2.4)
−
∫ t−
0
LBs (1− εs)Ss dN (1)s +
∫ t−
0
LSs (1 + εs)Ss dN
(2)
s
for some strategy S = (MBt ,M
S
t , L
B
t , L
S
t )t∈[0,T ], where the integrals with respect to MBt and MSt
are defined in (2.2).
Remark 2.2. In reality, liquidity providers do not always have priority over other traders, so that
their limit orders are not executed against all matching market orders. In our model, one can
7The assumption that LBt and L
S
t can be arbitrary predictable processes is justified because the submission and
deletion of limit orders is typically free.
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account for this by choosing smaller arrival rates for N
(1)
t and N
(2)
t . To wit, these processes may
just count the part of the market orders that actually trigger an execution.
Partial executions, from which we abstract, can to some extent be taken into account by reduc-
ing the arrival rates. Indeed, in the limiting regime of frequently arriving market orders, partial
execution has a similar effect as a full execution that takes place only with some probability.
Let now specify the primitives of our model. We work in a general Itoˆ process setting; in
particular, no Markovian structure is required. The mid price follows
dSt = Stσt dWt, S0 > 0,
for a Brownian motion Wt and a volatility process σt. Assuming the mid-price of the risky asset
to be a martingale allows to disentangle the effects of liquidity provision from pure investment due
to trends in the risky asset; on a technical level, it is also needed to obtain both long and short
positions even in the limit for small spreads. This assumption is reasonable since “market making
is typically not directional, in the sense that it does not profit from security prices going up or
down” [14]. Moreover, as in the optimal execution literature (e.g., [4, 1, 26]), it is also justified by
the time scales under consideration: we are not dealing with long-term investment here, but much
rather focusing on high-frequency liquidity provision strategies which are typically liquidated and
evaluated at the end of a trading day [25]. Models for high-frequency strategies designed to profit
from the predictability of short-term drifts are studied in [8, 13].
The arrival times of sell and buy orders by other market participants are modeled by counting
processes N
(1)
t and N
(2)
t with absolutely continuous jump intensities α
(1)
t and α
(2)
t , respectively;
8
we assume that N
(1)
t and N
(2)
t a.s. never jump at the same time. In contrast to most of the pre-
vious literature, we do not restrict ourselves to Poisson processes with independent and identically
distributed inter-arrival times. Instead, we allow for general arrival rates, thereby recapturing un-
certainty about future levels and also empirical observations such as the U-shaped distribution of
order flow over the trading day.
We are interested in limiting results for a small relative half-spread εt. Therefore, we parametrize
it as
εt = εEt,
for a small parameter ε and an Itoˆ process Et. Unlike for models with proportional transaction
costs (e.g., [31, 18]), where it is natural to assume that all other model parameters remain constant
as the spread tends to zero, the width of the spread is inextricably linked to the arrival rates of
exogenous market orders here. Indeed, market orders naturally occur more frequently for more
liquid markets with smaller spreads. Hence, we rescale the arrival rates accordingly:
α
(1)
t = λ
(1)
t ε
−ϑ, α(2)t = λ
(2)
t ε
−ϑ, for some ϑ ∈ (0, 1).
Here, ϑ > 0 ensures that the arrival rate of exogenous market orders explodes as the bid-ask
spread vanishes for ε→ 0. Nevertheless, the risk that limit orders are not executed fast enough is
a crucial factor for the solution in the limiting regime. ϑ < 1 is assumed to ensure that the profits
from liquidity provision vanish as ε → 0. Higher arrival rates necessitate extensions of the model
such as a price impact of incoming orders; see Section 5 for more details. In our optimal policy and
the corresponding utility, the exponent ϑ only appears in the rates of the asymptotic expansions;
the leading-order terms are fully determined by the arrival rates α
(1)
t , α
(2)
t .
The processes λ
(1)
t , λ
(2)
t , σt, and Et satisfy the following technical assumptions:
8That is, αit are predictable processes and N
i
t −
∫ t
0
αis ds are local martingales for i = 1, 2.
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Assumption 2.3. λ
(1)
t , λ
(2)
t , σ
2
t , and Et are positive continuous processes that are bounded and
bounded away from zero. Furthermore, Et is a semimartingale. Its predictable finite variation part
and the quadratic variation process of its local martingale part are absolutely continuous with a
bounded rate.
Note that we allow for any stochastic dependence of the processes λit and Et. In the market
microstructure literature (e.g., [9]), plausible distributions of trading times as functions of the
current bid-ask prices are derived.
2.2 Preferences
The investor’s preferences are described by a general von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
U : R→ R satisfying the following mild regularity conditions:
Assumption 2.4. (i) U is strictly concave, strictly increasing, and twice continuously differen-
tiable.
(ii) The corresponding absolute risk aversion is bounded and bounded away from zero:
c1 < ARA(x) := −U
′′(x)
U ′(x)
< c2, ∀x ∈ R, (2.5)
for some constants c1, c2 > 0.
Remark 2.5. Since U ′(x) = U ′(0) exp(
∫ x
0 U
′′(y)/U ′(y) dy), Condition (2.5) implies that
U ′(x), |U ′′(x)| ≤ C exp(−c2x), ∀x ≤ 0 and U ′(x), |U ′′(x)| ≤ C exp(−c1x), ∀x > 0, (2.6)
for some constant C > 0.
The arch-example satisfying these assumptions is of course the exponential utility U(x) =
− exp(−cx) with constant absolute risk aversion c > 0. Analogues of our results can also be
obtained for utilities defined on the positive half line, such as power utilities with constant relative
risk aversion. Here, we focus on utilities whose absolute risk aversion is uniformly bounded, because
these naturally lead to bounded monetary investments in the risky asset, in line with the “risk
budgets” often allocated in practice:
Definition 2.6. A family of self-financing portfolio processes (ϕ0,ε, ϕε)ε∈(0,1) in the limit order
market is called admissible if the monetary position ϕεS held in the risky asset is uniformly bounded.
This notion of admissibility is not restrictive. Indeed, it turns out that the optimal positions
held in the risky asset even converge to zero uniformly as ε→ 0 (cf. Theorem 3.1).
3 Main Results
The main results of the present study are a trading policy that is optimal at the leading order
ε2(1−ϑ) for small relative half-spreads εt = εEt, and an explicit formula for the utility that can be
obtained by applying it. To this end, define the monetary trading boundaries
βt =
2εtα
(2)
t
ARA(x0)σ2t
, β
t
= − 2εtα
(1)
t
ARA(x0)σ2t
,
7
and consider the strategy that keeps the risky position βεt = ϕtSt in the interval [βt, βt] by means
of market orders, while constantly updating the corresponding limit orders so as to trade to β
t
respectively βt whenever the buy respectively sell order of another market participant allows to sell
or buy at favorable prices, respectively. Formally, this means that the process (βεt )t∈[0,T ] is defined
as the unique solution to the Skorokhod stochastic differential equation
dβεt+ = β
ε
t σtdWt + (βt − βεt )dN (1)t + (β − βεt )dN (2)t + dΨt, βε0 = 0, (3.1)
where Ψt is the minimal finite variation process that keeps the solution in [βt, βt].
9 This corresponds
to the strategy
MBt :=
∫ t
0
1
Ss
dΨ+s , M
S
t :=
∫ t
0
1
Ss
dΨ−s , L
B
t :=
βt − βεt
St
, LSt :=
βεt − βt
St
. (3.2)
The family of associated portfolio processes given by
dϕεt+ =
1
St
dΨ+t −
1
St
dΨ−t +
βt − βεt
St
dN
(1)
t +
β
t
− βεt
St
dN
(2)
t , ϕ
ε
0 = 0,
dϕ0,εt+ = −(1 + εt)dΨ+t + (1− εt)dΨ−t + (1− εt)(βεt − βt)dN (1)t + (1 + εt)(βεt − βt)dN
(2)
t ,
ϕ0,ε0 = x0, is admissible with liquidation wealth processes X̂
ε
t := ϕ
0,ε
t + ϕ
ε
t1{ϕεt≥0}(1 − εt)St +
ϕεt1{ϕεt<0}(1 + εt)St. The following is the main result of the present paper:
Theorem 3.1. Suppose Assumptions 2.3 and 2.4 hold. Then, the above policy is optimal at the
leading order ε2(1−ϑ), in that:
E[U(X̂εT )] = U
(
x0 +
ε2(1−ϑ)
ARA(x0)
E
[∫ T
0
(
2E2t (λ(2)t )2
σ2t
1
A
(1)
t
+
2E2t (λ(1)t )2
σ2t
1
A
(2)
t
)
dt
])
+ o(ε2(1−ϑ)),
ε→ 0, for the corresponding liquidation wealth processes (X̂ε)ε∈(0,1), whereas
E[U(XεT )] ≤ U
(
x0 +
ε2(1−ϑ)
ARA(x0)
E
[∫ T
0
(
2E2t (λ(2)t )2
σ2t
1
A
(1)
t
+
2E2t (λ(1)t )2
σ2t
1
A
(2)
t
)
dt
])
+ o(ε2(1−ϑ)),
ε→ 0, for any competing family (Xε)ε∈(0,1) of admissible liquidation wealth processes.
Here, ω ∈ A(1)t respectively ω ∈ A(2)t means that the investor’s last trade before time t was a
purchase or sale, respectively, i.e. Ait = {ω | (ω, t) ∈ Ai}, i = 1, 2 for the predictable sets
A(1) =
{
(ω, t) | sup{s ∈ (0, t) | ∆N (1)s > 0} > sup{s ∈ (0, t) | ∆N (2)s > 0}
}
,
A(2) =
{
(ω, t) | sup{s ∈ (0, t) | ∆N (2)s > 0} ≥ sup{s ∈ (0, t) | ∆N (1)s > 0}
}
.
(3.3)
(By convention, before the first jump of (N (1), N (2)) all time points belong to A(2)).
If the model parameters λit, σt, εt are all constant, then the above formula reduces to
E[U(X̂εT )] = U
(
x0 +
2λ(1)λ(2)
ARA(x0)σ2
Tε2(1−ϑ)
)
+ o(ε2(1−ϑ)), ε→ 0.
9That is, β
t
≤ βεt ≤ βt and Ψt is a continuous process of finite variation such that
∫ t
0
1{βεs=βs}dΨs is nondecreasing,∫ t
0
1{βεs=βs}dΨs = 0 is nonincreasing, and
∫ t
0
1{β
s
<βεs<βs}dΨs vanishes. Existence and uniqueness of the solution is
guaranteed by Theorem 3.3 in S lomin´ski and Wojciechowski [29], applied to the evolution of (3.1) between the jump
times, without the integrals with respect to N
(1)
t and N
(2)
t . For the special reflected SDE we consider here, the
solution is constructed explicitly in (4.1).
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4 Proofs
This section contains the proof of our main result, Theorem 3.1. We proceed as follows: first, it is
shown that as the relative half-spread εt = εEt tends to zero and jumps to the trading boundaries
β
t
, βt become more and more frequent for our policy β
ε
t , almost all time is eventually spent near
β
t
, βt. Motivated by this result, we then construct a frictionless “shadow market”, which is at least
as favorable as the original limit order market, and for which the policy that oscillates between β
t
and βt is optimal at the leading order for small spreads. In a third step, we then show that the
utility obtained from applying our original policy βεt matches the one for the approximate optimizer
in the more favorable frictionless shadow market at the leading order for small spreads, so that our
candidate βεt is indeed optimal at the leading order.
4.1 An Approximation Result
As described above, we start by showing that our policy βεt spends almost all time near the bound-
aries β
t
, βt as the relative half-spread εt = εEt collapses to zero and orders of other market partici-
pants become more and more frequent:
Lemma 4.1. On the stochastic interval ]] inf{t > 0 | ∆N (1)t > 0 or ∆N (2)t > 0}, T ]], the process(
βεt − βt1A(1)t − βt1A(2)t
)
εϑ−1
converges to 0 uniformly in probability for ε→ 0.
Proof. The solution of the Skorokhod SDE (3.1) can be constructed explicitly. Let (τ εi )i∈N be the
jump times of N
(1)
t , i.e. the jumps of β
ε
t to the upper boundary βt. (To ease notation we suitably
extend the model beyond T .) From τ εi up to the next jump time of (N
(1)
t , N
(2)
t ), the solution is
then given by
βεt = exp
(∫ t
τεi
σu dWu − 1
2
∫ t
τεi
σ2u du− sup
{∫ s
τεi
σu dWu − 1
2
∫ s
τεi
σ2u du− ln
(
βs
) | s ∈ [τ εi , t]
})
(4.1)
(analogously after jump times of N
(2)
t ), and Ψt = Ψτεi + β
ε
t − βτεi −
∫ t
τεi
βεuσu dWu. Indeed, β
ε from
(4.1) satisfies dβεt = β
ε
t σt dWt − βεt d
(
sup
{∫ s
τεi
σu dWu − 12
∫ s
τεi
σ2u du− ln
(
βs
) | s ∈ [τ εi , t]}), and
the latter integrator is nondecreasing and on the set {βε < β} even constant because the above
supremum is not attained at t if ln(βεt ) < ln(βt).
Define the process
Yt :=
∫ t
0
σu dWu − 1
2
∫ t
0
σ2u du− ln
(
2Etλ(2)t
ARA(x0)σ2t
)
, t ≥ 0.
Yt does not depend on the scaling parameter ε, and, by Assumption 2.3, it possesses almost surely
continuous paths, which implies that
sup
t1,t2∈[0,T ], |t2−t1|≤h
|Yt2 − Yt1 | → 0, a.s., h→ 0. (4.2)
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By (4.1), one has
βεt
βt
= exp
(
Yt − sup
s∈[τεi ,t]
Ys
)
(4.3)
for all t between τ εi and the next jump time of (N
(1)
t , N
(2)
t ) and
exp
(
Yt − sup
s∈[τεi ,t]
Ys
)
≥ exp
(
− sup
t1,t2∈[0,T ], |t2−t1|≤h
|Yt2 − Yt1 |
)
for h > 0, t ∈ (τ εi , (τ εi + h) ∧ T ].(4.4)
Now, fix any ε˜ > 0. By (4.2), there exists h˜ > 0 with
P
(
exp
(
− sup
t1,t2∈[0,T ], |t2−t1|≤h˜
|Yt2 − Yt1 |
)
< 1− ε˜
)
≤ ε˜
3
. (4.5)
Note that, after a limit sell order execution, βεt jumps to βt < 0 and then cannot enter the
region [0, (1 − ε˜)βt) before the next limit buy order execution. As a result, we can use (4.3) and
estimate the excursions away from the upper trading boundary βt as follows:
P
(
∃t ∈ (τ ε1 , T ] s.t.
βεt
βt
∈ [0, 1− ε˜)
)
≤ P
M1,ε ∪ b2Tλ
(1)
maxε
−ϑc⋃
i=1
M2,ε,i ∪
b2Tλ(1)maxε−ϑc⋃
i=1
M3,ε,i
 , (4.6)
where
M1,ε := {ω ∈ Ω | N (1)T (ω) > b2Tλ(1)maxε−ϑc},
M2,ε,i := {ω ∈ Ω | τ εi+1(ω)− τ εi (ω) > h˜},
M3,ε,i :=
{
ω ∈ Ω | exp(Yt(ω)− sup
s∈[τεi (ω),t]
Ys(ω)) < 1− ε˜ for some t ∈ (τ εi (ω), (τ εi (ω) + h˜) ∧ T ]
}
,
with λ
(1)
maxε−ϑ being an upper bound for the jump intensity of the counting process N
(1)
t . In
plain English, there are either many jumps to the upper boundary βt, and/or there is a long-time
excursion away from βt, and/or there is a short excursion that nevertheless takes the risky position
βεt sufficiently far way from the boundary βt. In the sequel, we show that the probability for these
events is smaller than ε˜ for ε sufficiently small. Observe that after the first jump of (N
(1)
t , N
(2)
t ) we
have 0 < βεt ≤ βt on A(1)t and βt ≤ βεt < 0 on A
(2)
t . As βt =
2Etλ(2)t
σ2t
ε1−ϑ and the process 2Etλ
(2)
t
σ2t
is
bounded, the estimate for (4.6) in turn yields that |βεt − βt|εϑ−11A(1)t → 0 uniformly in probability.
By applying the same arguments to βεt on A
(2)
t we obtain the assertion.
Let us now derive the required estimates for (4.6). First, recall that the time-changed process
u 7→ N (1)Γu with Γu := inf{v ≥ 0 |
∫ v
0 λ
(1)
s ε−ϑ ds = u} is a standard Poisson process (cf. [5,
Theorem 16]) and Γ
λ
(1)
maxε−ϑT
≥ T . As a result:
P (M1,ε) ≤ P (N (1)Γ
λ
(1)
maxε
−ϑT
> b2Tλ(1)maxε−ϑc) ≤
ε˜
3
, for ε small enough, (4.7)
by the law of large numbers.
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Next, since the jump intensity of N
(1)
t is bounded from below by some λ
(1)
minε
−ϑ > 0, we obtain
P
(
τ εi+1 − τ εi >
x
λ
(1)
minε
−ϑ
)
≤ exp(−x), x ∈ R+, i ∈ N.
Choosing x = λ
(1)
minε
−ϑh˜, this estimate yields
P
(
τ εi+1 − τ εi > h˜ for some i = 1, . . . , b2Tλ(1)maxε−ϑc
)
≤ b2Tλ(1)maxε−ϑc exp
(
−λ(1)minε−ϑh˜
)
.
This in turn gives
P
b2Tλ(1)maxε−ϑc⋃
i=1
M2,ε,i
 ≤ ε˜
3
, for ε small enough. (4.8)
Finally, by (4.4) and (4.5), we have that
P
b2Tλ(1)maxε−ϑc⋃
i=1
M3,ε,i
 ≤ P (exp(− sup
t1,t2∈[0,T ], |t2−t1|≤h˜
|Yt2 − Yt1 |
)
< 1− ε˜
)
≤ ε˜
3
(4.9)
for ε small enough. Piecing together (4.7), (4.8), and (4.9), it follows that the probability in (4.6)
is indeed bounded by ε˜ for sufficiently small ε. This completes the proof.
4.2 An Auxiliary Frictionless Shadow Market
Similarly as for markets with proportional transaction costs [19] and for limit order markets [22],
we reduce the original optimization problem to a frictionless version, by replacing the mid-price
St with a suitable “shadow price” S˜t. The latter is potentially more favorable for trading but
nevertheless leads to an equivalent optimal strategy and utility. The key difference to [22] is that
we focus on asymptotic results for small spreads here. Hence, it suffices to determine “approximate”
shadow prices: these are at least as favorable, and there exist strategies that trade at the same
prices in both markets for all spreads, but are only “almost” optimal in the frictionless market for
small spreads. This simplifies the construction significantly, and thereby allows to treat the general
framework considered here.
Indeed, the approximation result established in Lemma 4.1 suggests that it suffices to look
for a frictionless shadow market where the optimal policy oscillates between the upper and lower
boundaries β
t
, βt at the jump times of the counting processes N
(1)
t , N
(2)
t . To this end, it turns out
that one can simply let the shadow price jump to the bid respectively ask price whenever a limit
buy respectively sell order is executed, and then let it evolve as the bid respectively ask price until
the next jump time. To make this precise, let S˜0 = (1 + ε0)S0 and define
dS˜t
S˜t−
= σtdWt + 1A(1)t
((
1 + εt
1− εt − 1
)
dN
(2)
t −
1
1− εtdεt −
σt
1− εtd〈W, ε〉t
)
+1
A
(2)
t
((
1− εt
1 + εt
− 1
)
dN
(1)
t +
1
1 + εt
dεt +
σt
1 + εt
d〈W, ε〉t
)
(4.10)
=: dR˜t,
11
with A(1) and A(2) from (3.3), where the terms − 11−εtdεt− σt1−εtd〈W, ε〉t and 11+εtdεt + σt1+εtd〈W, ε〉t
ensure that S˜t = (1 − εt)St on A(1)t+ := lim supn→∞A(1)t+1/n and S˜t = (1 + εt)St on A
(2)
t+ :=
lim supn→∞A
(2)
t+1/n even for time-varying εt. (The correction terms can easily be derived by apply-
ing the integration by parts formula to the processes 1∓ εt and St.) Then:
(1− εt)St ≤ S˜t ≤ (1 + εt)St, S˜t = (1− εt)St on ∆N (1)t > 0, S˜t = (1 + εt)St on ∆N (2)t > 0.(4.11)
That is, the frictionless price process S˜t evolves in the bid-ask spread, and therefore always leads
to at least as favorable trading prices for market orders. When more favorable trading prices are
available due to the execution of limit orders, S˜t jumps to match these. Hence, trading S˜t is at
least as profitable as the original limit order market.
The key step now is to determine the optimal policy for S˜t. In the corresponding frictionless
market, portfolios can be equivalently parametrized directly in terms of monetary positions η˜t =
ϕtS˜t− held in the risky asset, with associated wealth process
X˜ η˜t = x0 +
∫ t
0
η˜sdR˜s.
We have the following dichotomy:
Lemma 4.2. Let (η˜εt )ε∈(0,1) be a uniformly bounded family of policies with associated wealth pro-
cesses X˜ η˜
ε
. Then, for every δ > 0 there exists an εδ > 0 such that:
P
(
X˜ η˜
ε
t ∈ (x0 − δ, x0 + δ), ∀t ∈ [0, T ]
)
≥ 1− δ or E
[
U
(
X˜ η˜
ε
T
)]
< U(x0), ∀ε ≤ εδ. (4.12)
Proof. Step 1: Let δ > 0. Strict concavity of U implies
U(X˜ η˜
ε
T ) ≤ U(x0) + U ′(x0)(X˜ η˜
ε − x0) +
[
U(x0 + δ)− U(x0)− U ′(x0)δ
]
1{X˜ η˜εT ≥x0+δ}
+
[
U(x0 − δ)− U(x0) + U ′(x0)δ
]
1{X˜ η˜εT ≤x0−δ}
(4.13)
and
0 > max
{
U(x0 + δ)− U(x0)− U ′(x0)δ, U(x0 − δ)− U(x0) + U ′(x0)δ
}
=: f(δ).
By Assumption 2.3, there exists K ∈ R+ such that E
(
X˜ η˜
ε
)
≤ x0 + Kε1−ϑ for all ε ∈ (0, 1).
Together with (4.13), this yields
E
[
U(X˜ η˜
ε
T )
]
≤ U(x0) + U ′(x0)Kε1−ϑ + P
(
X˜ η˜
ε
T 6∈ (x0 − δ, x0 + δ)
)
f(δ).
As a result, the expected utility either lies below U(x0) or
P
(
X˜ η˜
ε
T 6∈ (x0 − δ, x0 + δ)
)
≤ U
′(x0)Kε1−ϑ
−f(δ) . (4.14)
Since the right-hand side of (4.14) tends to zero as ε→ 0, this already proves the assertion at the
terminal time t = T . In the remaining three steps, we show how to extend the assertion to all
intermediate times t ∈ [0, T ] in a uniform manner.
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Step 2: Instead of X˜ η˜
ε
t , we first consider the processes x0 +
∫ t
0 η˜
ε
sσs dWs, ε ∈ (0, 1). They are
true martingales and
sup
ε∈(0,1)
E
[(∫ T
0
η˜εsσs dWs
)2]
<∞.
Therefore the family (| ∫ T0 η˜εsσs dWs|p)ε∈(0,1) is uniformly integrable for any p ∈ (1, 2). As a conse-
quence, for every ξ > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such that
P
(∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
η˜εsσs dWs
∣∣∣∣ ≥ δ) ≤ δ =⇒ E
(∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
η˜εsσs dWs
∣∣∣∣p
)
≤ ξ (4.15)
for every ε ∈ (0, 1). By Doob’s maximal inequality,
E
(
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
η˜εsσs dWs
∣∣∣∣p
)
≤
(
p
p− 1
)p
E
(∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
η˜εsσs dWs
∣∣∣∣p
)
. (4.16)
From (4.15) and (4.16), we conclude that
∀ξ > 0 ∃δ > 0 ∀ε ∈ (0, 1) P
(∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
η˜εsσs dWs
∣∣∣∣ ≥ δ) ≤ δ
=⇒ P
(
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
η˜εsσs dWs
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ξ
)
≤ ξ.
Step 3: Let us show that the processes X˜ η˜
ε
t − x0 −
∫ t
0 η˜
ε
sσs dWs tend to zero uniformly in prob-
ability for ε → 0 (see (4.10) for the difference of R˜t and
∫ t
0 σs dWs). By (4.7), the fact that εt
tends linearly to zero, and the uniform boundedness of η˜εt , the dN
i
t - and dt-terms of X˜
η˜ε
t converge
to zero in the total variation distance for ε → 0. The same holds for the integrals with respect to
〈W, ε〉t and the integrals with respect to the drift part of εt. To show convergence “uniformly in
probability” of the integrals with respect to the continuous martingale part of εt, we again use the
arguments of Step 2.
Step 4: Now, we complete the proof of the lemma by combining the assertions of the previous
three steps. Let ξ > 0. By Step 2, there exist a δ ∈ (0, ξ) s.t. for all ε ∈ (0, 1) the implication
P
(∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
η˜εsσs dWs
∣∣∣∣ ≥ δ) ≤ δ =⇒ P
(
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
η˜εsσs dWs
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ξ/2
)
≤ ξ/2 (4.17)
holds. By Step 3, there exists ε˜ > 0 s.t.
P
(
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣∣X˜ η˜εs − x0 − ∫ t
0
η˜εsσs dWs
∣∣∣∣ ≥ δ/2
)
≤ δ/2, ∀ε ∈ (0, ε˜). (4.18)
In addition, by the triangle inequality, one has
P
(∣∣∣∣∫ T
0
η˜εsσs dWs
∣∣∣∣ ≥ δ) ≤ P (|X˜ η˜εT − x0| ≥ δ/2) + P (∣∣∣∣X˜ η˜εT − x0 − ∫ T
0
η˜εsσs dWs
∣∣∣∣ ≥ δ/2) . (4.19)
By Step 1, there exists ε̂ > 0 s.t. for all ε ∈ (0, ε̂)
P (|X˜ η˜εT − x0| ≥ δ/2) ≤ δ/2 or E
[
U
(
X˜ η˜
ε
T
)]
< U(x0).
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Now, let ε ∈ (0, ε˜ ∧ ε̂). Either one has E
[
U
(
X˜ η˜
ε
T
)]
< U(x0) or, by (4.19), (4.18), one can apply
implication (4.17) to conclude that P
(
supt∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣∫ t0 η˜εsσs dWs∣∣∣ ≥ ξ/2) ≤ ξ/2. Together with (4.18),
δ ≤ ξ, and again the triangle inequality, one arrives at
P
(
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣∣X˜ η˜εs − x0∣∣∣ ≥ ξ
)
≤ ξ.
Remark 4.3. Lemma 4.2 asserts that, for small ε, the wealth process of a policy either remains
uniformly close to the initial position or the policy is “extremely bad” in the sense that the corre-
sponding expected utility is smaller than the obtained by not trading the risky asset at all.
Starting from an arbitrary uniformly bounded family of policies (η˜ε)ε∈(0,1), we may replace η˜ε
by 0 for all ε for which E[U(X˜ η˜
ε
T )] < U(x0). Then, the modified family of wealth processes performs
at least as well as the original one, and Lemma 4.2 implies that the modified family converges to
x0 uniformly in probability for ε → 0. Henceforth, we therefore assume this property already for
(X˜ η˜
ε
)ε∈(0,1) without loss of generality.
Let us now compute the expected utility obtained by applying such a family of policies (η˜ε)ε∈(0,1).
By Assumption 2.3, the integrals with respect to εt and 〈W, ε〉t in (4.10) are dominated for
ε → 0. Indeed, the continuous martingale parts are dominated by σt dWt and the drift terms are
dominated by the drifts of the integrals with respect to the counting processes N it , which are of
order 2ε1−ϑEtλit. Hence, these terms can be safely neglected in the sequel.
Itoˆ’s formula as in [17, Theorem I.4.57] and [17, Theorem II.1.8] yield:
U(X˜ η˜
ε
T ) = U(x0) +
∫ T
0
U ′(X˜ η˜
ε
t−)η˜
ε
tσtdWt +
1
2
∫ T
0
U ′′(X˜ η˜
ε
t−)(η˜
ε
t )
2σ2t dt (4.20)
+
(
U(X˜ η˜
ε
− + η˜
εx)− U(X˜ η˜ε− )
)
∗ (µR˜ − νR˜)T +
(
U(X˜ η˜
ε
− + η˜
εx)− U(X˜ η˜ε− )
)
∗ νR˜T ,
where µR˜ is the jump measure of R˜ (see e.g. [17, Proposition II.1.16]) and νR˜ its compensator
in the sense of [17, Theorem II.1.8]. The integrals with respect to the Brownian motion Wt and
the compensated random measure µR˜ − νR˜ are true martingales. To see this, first consider the
Brownian integral. By (2.6) we have
U ′(X˜ η˜
ε
t−) ≤ C exp(−c2X˜ η˜
ε
t−)1{X˜ η˜εt−<0}
+ U ′(0)1{X˜ η˜εt−≥0}
with constants C, c2 > 0. Therefore and due to the boundedness of η˜
ε
tσt, it suffices to show that
E
[∫ T
0
exp(−2c2X˜ η˜
ε
t )dt
]
<∞. (4.21)
By the Doleans-Dade exponential formula [17, Theorem I.4.61] and [17, Theorem II.1.8], we have
exp(−2c2X˜ η˜
ε
t ) = exp(−2c2x0)E
(
−2c2
∫ ·
0
η˜εsσdWs + (exp(−2c2η˜εx)− 1) ∗
(
µR˜ − νR˜
))
t
(4.22)
× exp
(∫ t
0
(2c22(η˜
ε
s)
2σ2s)ds+ (exp(−2c2η˜εx)− 1) ∗ νR˜t
)
.
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For all t ∈ [0, T ], the ordinary exponential in the above representation is uniformly bounded by
a single constant. This is because σ2t as well as (η˜
ε
t )
2 are both uniformly bounded and, since
the intensities ε−ϑλ(1)t , ε−ϑλ
(2)
t are bounded for any ε > 0, the same holds for the jump part (for
sufficiently small ε):
(exp(−2c2η˜εx)− 1) ∗ νR˜t =
∫ t
0
(exp(−2c2η˜εs2εs/(1− εs))− 1) 1A(1)s ε
−ϑλ(2)s ds
+
∫ t
0
(exp(2c2η˜
ε
s2εs/(1 + εs))− 1) 1A(2)s ε
−ϑλ(1)s ds.
(4.21) now follows since the stochastic exponential in (4.22) is not only a local martingale, but also
a supermartingale with decreasing expectation because it is positive for sufficiently small ε.
The argument for the integral with respect to the compensated random measure µR˜ − νR˜ in
(4.20) is similar. By the mean value theorem, (2.6), and [17, Theorem II.1.33] it suffices to show
E
[
exp(−2c2X˜ η˜ε) ∗ νR˜T
]
<∞.
But this follows verbatim as for the Brownian integral above, again using that the jumps of R˜t as
well as the corresponding jump intensities are all uniformly bounded. In summary, (4.20) therefore
gives10
E[U(X˜ η˜
ε
T )]− U(x0)
= E
[∫ T
0
1
2
U ′′(X˜ η˜
ε
t−)(η˜
ε
t )
2σ2t dt+ (U(X˜
η˜ε
− + η˜
εx)− U(X˜ η˜ε− )) ∗ νR˜T
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
((
1
2
U ′′(X˜ η˜
ε
t−)(η˜
ε
t )
2σ2t + U
′(X˜ η˜
ε
t−)η˜
ε
t
2εt
1− εt ε
−ϑλ(2)t
)
1
A
(1)
t
+
(
1
2
U ′′(X˜ η˜
ε
t−)(η˜
ε
t )
2σ2t − U ′(X˜ η˜
ε
t−)η˜
ε
t
2εt
1 + εt
ε−ϑλ(1)t
)
1
A
(2)
t
)
dt
]
, (4.23)
where for the inequality we have used the concavity of U and inserted the definition of R˜t. By (2.6),
(4.21) also shows that the random variables in (4.23) are integrable. Moreover, for any uniformly
bounded family of policies η˜εt ,∫ T
0
U ′(X˜ η˜
ε
t ) dt and
∫ T
0
U ′′(X˜ η˜
ε
t ) dt are uniformly integrable for ε ∈ (0, ε0), (4.24)
where ε0 > 0 is a sufficiently small constant. Indeed, it follows from the proof of (4.21) that the
bound therein holds uniformly in ε ∈ (0, ε0). Then, using Jensen’s inequality, we observe that(∫ T
0 U
′(X˜ η˜
ε
t ) dt
)2
,
(∫ T
0 U
′′(X˜ η˜
ε
t ) dt
)2
are uniformly bounded in expectation, which in turn yields
(4.24)
For fixed wealth X˜ η˜
ε
t−, the integrand in the upper bound of (4.23) is a quadratic function in
the policy η˜εt . Plugging in the pointwise maximizer
2ε1−ϑEtλ(2)t
ARA(X˜ η˜
ε
t−)σ
2
t (1−εEt)
1
A
(1)
t
− 2ε1−ϑEtλ
(1)
t
ARA(X˜ η˜
ε
t−)σ
2
t (1+εEt)
1
A
(2)
t
,
10If the integrals with respect to εt and 〈W, ε〉t are taken into account explicitly, these only lead to an additional
higher-order term that can be bounded by a constant times εη˜εt for small ε.
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which is of order O(ε1−ϑ) (uniformly in ω, t) by (2.5), therefore yields the following upper bound:11
E[U(X˜ η˜
ε
T )]− U(x0)
≤
∫ T
0
E
[(
−U
′(X˜ η˜
ε
t )
2
U ′′(X˜ η˜
ε
t )
2ε2(1−ϑ)E2t (λ(2)t )2
σ2t
)
1
A
(1)
t
+
(
−U
′(X˜ η˜
ε
t )
2
U ′′(X˜ η˜
ε
t )
2ε2(1−ϑ)E2t (λ(1)t )2
σ2t
)
1
A
(2)
t
]
dt
+ o(ε2(1−ϑ)).
Here, we used 2εt/(1∓ εt) = ∓2εt+O(ε2) and that, by (4.24), the remainder is uniformly bounded
in expectation.
For the family of feedback policies
η˜ε,∗t =
2ε1−ϑEtλ(2)t
ARA(X˜ η˜
ε,∗
t− )σ2t
1
A
(1)
t
− 2ε
1−ϑEtλ(1)t
ARA(X˜ η˜
ε,∗
t− )σ2t
1
A
(2)
t
(4.25)
that converges uniformly to zero as ε→ 0, this inequality becomes an equality at the leading order
ε2(1−ϑ), namely:
E[U(X˜ η˜
ε,∗
T )]− U(x0) (4.26)
= E
[∫ T
0
((
1
2
U ′′(X˜ η˜
ε,∗
t− )(η˜
ε,∗
t )
2σ2t + U
′(X˜ η˜
ε,∗
t− )η˜
ε,∗
t
2εt
1− εt ε
−ϑλ(2)t
)
1
A
(1)
t
+
(
1
2
U ′′(X˜ η˜
ε,∗
t− )(η˜
ε,∗
t )
2σ2t − U ′(X˜ η˜
ε,∗
t− )η˜
ε
t
2εt
1 + εt
ε−ϑλ(1)t
)
1
A
(2)
t
)
dt
]
+ o(ε2(1−ϑ))
=
∫ T
0
E
[(
−U
′(X˜ η˜
ε,∗
t )
2
U ′′(X˜ η˜
ε,∗
t )
2ε2(1−ϑ)E2t (λ(2)t )2
σ2t
)
1
A
(1)
t
+
(
−U
′(X˜ η˜
ε,∗
t )
2
U ′′(X˜ η˜
ε,∗
t )
2ε2(1−ϑ)E2t (λ(1)t )2
σ2t
)
1
A
(2)
t
]
dt
+ o(ε2(1−ϑ)).
Here, the first equality follows from the mean value theorem because the differential remainder is
bounded by C|U ′(X˜ η˜ε,∗t− + ξ) − U ′(X˜ η˜
ε,∗
t− )|ε2(1−η) for some constant C > 0, not depending on ε as
η˜ε,∗/ε1−ϑ is bounded for ε → 0 by (2.5), and some bounded random variable ξ which tends to
0 pointwise for ε → 0. With (4.24) it follows that the term is uniformly integrable, so that the
remainder is indeed of order o(ε2(1−η)).
As a result:
E[U(X˜ η˜
ε
T )]− E[U(X˜ η˜
ε,∗
T )] ≤ ε2(1−ϑ)M
∫ T
0
E
[∣∣∣∣∣U ′(X˜ η˜
ε,∗
t )
2
U ′′(X˜ η˜
ε,∗
t )
− U
′(X˜ η˜
ε
t )
2
U ′′(X˜ η˜
ε
t )
∣∣∣∣∣
]
dt+ o(ε2(1−ϑ)), (4.27)
where the constant M is a uniform bound for 2E2t (λ(2)t )2/σ2t and 2E2t (λ(1)t )2/σ2t .
With X˜ η˜
ε → x0, we also have U ′(X˜ η˜ε)2/U ′′(X˜ η˜ε) → U ′(x0)2/U ′′(x0) uniformly in probability
as ε→ 0. As above, by (4.24) we have uniform integrability, so that this convergence in fact holds
in L1. Hence, (4.27) and the dominated convergence theorem for Lebesgue integrals yield
E[U(X˜ η˜
ε
T )] ≤ E[U(X˜ η˜
ε,∗
T )] + o(ε
2(1−ϑ)), (4.28)
that is, the family (η˜ε,∗t )ε>0 is approximately optimal at the leading order ε2(1−ϑ).
11If the integrals with respect to εt and 〈W, ε〉t are taken into account explicitly, this does not change the pointwise
optimizer and the corresponding upper bound at the leading order.
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Together with (4.26), the same argument also yields that the corresponding leading-order opti-
mal utility is given by
E[U(X˜ η˜
ε,∗
T )] = U(x0)−
U ′(x0)2
2U ′′(x0)
E
[∫ T
0
(η˜ε,∗t )
2d〈R˜〉t
]
+ o(ε2(1−ϑ))
= U
(
x0 +
ε2(1−ϑ)
ARA(x0)
E
[∫ T
0
(
2E2t (λ(2)t )2
σ2t
1
A
(1)
t
+
2E2t (λ(1)t )2
σ2t
1
A
(2)
t
)
dt
])
+ o(ε2(1−ϑ)),
where the second equality follows from Taylor’s theorem and the definition of η˜ε,∗t .
If all the model parameters λit, σt, εt are constant, the integrals in this formula can be computed
explicitly. Indeed, since P [A
(1)
t ] = 1− P [A(2)t ] = λ(1)/(λ(1) + λ(2)), it then follows that
E[U(X˜ η˜
ε,∗
T )] = U
(
x0 +
2λ(1)λ(2)
ARA(x0)σ2
ε2(1−ϑ)T
)
+ o(ε2(1−ϑ)).
4.3 Proof of the Main Result
We now complete the proof of our main result. To this end, we use that the policy βεt proposed
in Section 3 is uniformly close to the almost optimal policy η˜ε,∗t in the shadow market with price
process S˜t by Lemma 4.1. Since trading in the frictionless shadow market is at least as favorable
as in the original limit order market, and the policy βεt trades at the same prices in both markets,
this in turn yields the leading-order optimality of βεt .
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let
ηεt := β
ε
t
(
(1− εt)1{βεt>0} + (1 + εt)1{βεt<0}
)
,
where βεt is the solution of (3.1), which is of order O(ε
1−ϑ) uniformly in ω, t. Note that ηεt is the
risky position of the policy βεt if the risky asset is valued at the shadow price S˜t instead of the mid
price St.
Step 1: We want to compare the S˜t-wealth of η
ε
t with the wealth of the approximate optimizer
η˜ε,∗t in the S˜t-market defined in (4.25).
By (4.24), in the expansion (4.23), one can replace U ′(X˜ η˜
ε
t ) and U
′′(X˜ η˜
ε
t ) by U
′(x0) and U ′′(x0),
respectively, leading to a remainder of order o(ε2(1−ϑ)), for any family of policies η˜εt with the
property that η˜εt /ε
1−ϑ is uniformly bounded. Applied to ηεt and η˜
ε,∗
t , this yields
E[U(X˜η
ε
T )]− E[U(X˜ η˜
ε,∗
T )]
= E
[∫ T
0
((
1
2
U ′′(x0)(ηεt )
2σ2t + U
′(x0)ηεt
2εt
1− εt ε
−ϑλ(2)t
)
1
A
(1)
t
+
(
1
2
U ′′(x0)(ηεt )
2σ2t − U ′(x0)ηεt
2εt
1 + εt
ε−ϑλ(1)t
)
1
A
(2)
t
)
dt
]
−E
[∫ T
0
(
−U
′(x0)2
U ′′(x0)
2ε2(1−ϑ)E2t (λ(2)t )2
σ2t
)
1
A
(1)
t
+
(
−U
′(x0)2
U ′′(x0)
2ε2(1−ϑ)E2t (λ(1)t )2
σ2t
)
1
A
(2)
t
dt
]
+o(ε2(1−ϑ))
= E
[∫ T
0
1
2
U ′′(x0)σ2t
(
(ηεt − β1A(1)t − β1A(2)t )
2 + (η˜ε,∗t − β1A(1)t − β1A(2)t )
2
)
dt
]
(4.29)
+o(ε2(1−ϑ)).
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By Lemma 4.1 and since ηεt − βεt = O(ε2−ϑ), we have (ηεt − βt1A(1)t − βt1A(2)t )/ε
1−ϑ → 0 after the
first jump of (N
(1)
t , N
(2)
t ), uniformly in probability. The same holds for η˜
ε,∗
t . As the expectation of
the first jump time of (N
(1)
t , N
(2)
t ) is of order O(ε
ϑ) (and the integrands in the last line of (4.29)
are uniformly of order O(ε2(1−ϑ))), this gives
E
[∫ T
0
1
2
U ′′(x0)σ2t
(
(ηεt − β1A(1)t − β1A(2)t )
2 + (η˜ε,∗t − β1A(1)t − β1A(2)t )
2
)
dt
]
= o(ε2(1−ϑ)) +O(ε2−ϑ)
= o(ε2(1−ϑ)).
Step 2: Let (ψ0,ε, ψε)ε∈(0,1) be an arbitrary admissible family of portfolio processes in the limit
order market with (ψ0,ε0 , ψ
ε
0) = (x0, 0). By (4.11) and Step 1 in the proof of [22, Proposition 1], we
have
ψ0,εt + ψ
ε
t 1{ψεt≥0}(1− εt)St + ψεt 1{ψεt<0}(1 + εt)St ≤ x0 +
∫ t
0
ψεsdS˜s. (4.30)
Due to the boundedness of S˜/S, admissibility in the sense of Definition 2.6 implies that the fam-
ily (ψεS˜)ε∈(0,1) is uniformly bounded. Thus, we can apply (4.28), i.e. the family is dominated by
the feedback policies η˜ε,∗.
Now take the strategy (3.2). For the corresponding portfolio process (ϕ0,εt , ϕ
ε
t )t∈[0,T ] we have
ηεt = ϕ
ε
t S˜t− and – by construction of the strategy and S˜t – (4.30) holds with equality for (ψ
0,ε
t , ψ
ε
t ) =
(ϕ0,εt , ϕ
ε
t ). Together with (4.29) and the approximate optimality of η˜
ε,∗
t in the S˜t-market, this yields
the assertion.
5 Price Impact of Exogenous Orders
In our model, bid and ask prices remain unaffected by the execution of incoming orders. This is
the most optimistic scenario for liquidity providers because – modulo inventory risk – it allows
them to earn the full spread between alternating buy and sell trades. Disregarding price impact
is reasonable for small noise traders whose orders do not carry any information. For strategic and
possibly informed counterparties, however, it is questionable. For these, prices are expected to rise
after purchases and fall after sales, respectively (compare, e.g., [11, 23]). Similarly, larger orders
of other market participants also move market prices in the same directions by depleting the order
book [26].
Our basic model can be extended to incorporate the price impact of incoming orders in reduced
form.12 Indeed, suppose that the mid price follows
dSt
St−
= σt dWt − κεt dN (1)t + κεt dN (2)t , (5.1)
for some price impact parameter κ ∈ [0, 1). With the information Ft−, our small investor is allowed
to place limit buy orders at the bid price (1−εt)St− and limit sell orders at the ask price (1+εt)St−
immediately before the jump of St. However, bid and ask prices jump down after exogenous sell
orders arrive at the jump times of N
(1)
t , and jump up after exogenous buy orders arrive at the jump
12This is similar in spirit to the Almgren-Chriss model [1] from the optimal execution literature, in that we also do
not attempt to specify the dynamics of the whole order book, but instead directly model the price moves caused by
executions.
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times of N
(2)
t . (Note that this happens irrespective of the liquidity our small investor chooses to
provide.) Formally, this means that the self-financing condition (2.4) is replaced by13
ϕ0t = x0 −
∫ t
0
((1 + εs)Ss−, (1 + εs)Ss) dMBs +
∫ t
0
((1− εs)Ss−, (1− εs)Ss) dMSs
−
∫ t−
0
LBs (1− εs)Ss− dN (1)s +
∫ t−
0
LSs (1 + εs)Ss− dN
(2)
s .
The parameter κ represents the fraction of the half-spread εtSt− by which prices are moved.14
κ = 0 corresponds to the model without price impact studied above. Conversely, κ ≈ 1 leads to a
model in the spirit of Madhavan et al. [23], where liquidity providers do not earn the spread, but
only a small exogenous compensation for their services.15
In the model, the liquidity provider does not internalize the price impact and therefore continues
to post liquidity at the best bid and ask prices. This assumption is made for tractability. Indeed,
the motivation for this restriction of the considered limit prices is not as compelling as in the basic
model with continuous bid-ask prices. Alternatively, as in [6], one can consider models where the
size of the liquidity provider’s order is fixed but it can be posted deeper in the order book to
mitigate the adverse price impact.16 Incorporating strategic decisions concerning order size and
location in a tractable manner is a challenging direction for future research.
In the above extension of our model, the optimal policy is similar to the one in the baseline
version without price impact. One still trades to some position limits β
t
, βt whenever limit orders
are executed. However, since the adverse effect of price impact diminishes the incentive to provide
liquidity, β
t
, βt are reduced accordingly. If executions move bid and ask prices by a fraction κ of
the current half-spread εtSt−, then
βt =
2εt((1− κ2 )α
(2)
t − κ2α
(1)
t )
ARA(x0)σ2t
, β
t
= −2εt((1−
κ
2 )α
(1)
t − κ2α
(2)
t )
ARA(x0)σ2t
, (5.2)
given that (1− κ2 )α
(2)
t − κ2α
(1)
t and (1− κ2 )α
(1)
t − κ2α
(2)
t are positive. In the symmetric case α
(1)
t =
α
(2)
t = αt, i.e., if buy and sell orders arrive at the same rates, this holds if and only if κ < 1. In
this case,
βt =
2εt(1− κ)αt
2ARA(x0)σ2t
, β
t
= − 2εt(1− κ)αt
2ARA(x0)σ2t
,
so that price impact equal to a fraction κ of the current half-spread εtSt− simply reduces liquidity
provision by a factor of 1−κ. In particular, if κ ≈ 1, then the boundaries can be of order o(ε1−ϑ). As
a result, arrival rates of a higher order than ε−ϑ, ϑ ∈ (0, 1) can be used without implying nontrivial
profits as the spread collapses to zero. In any case, the formula (1.2) for the corresponding leading-
order certainty equivalent remains the same after replacing the trading boundaries accordingly.
13For the integrals with respect to MBt and M
S
t see (2.1). Since M
B
t −MBt−, MSt −MSt− have to be predictable
and since, by the assumptions on N (1), N (2), the jump times of (5.1) are totally inaccessible stopping times, market
orders are actually always executed at (1± εt)St.
14Note that, as in [6], price impact is permanent here. Tracking an exogenous benchmark in a limit order market
with transient price impact as in [26] is studied by [16].
15Indeed, after a successful execution of a limit order the mid price jumps close to the limit price of the order if
κ ≈ 1. This means that the liquidity provider actually trades at similar prices as in a frictionless market with price
process St. If moreover α
(1)
t = α
(2)
t , the mid price is still a martingale and expected profits vanish.
16Also compare [7], where two types of models are discusses. In the first one, one can post one limit order for one
share with an arbitrary limit price. In the second, limit prices are fixed at the best bid-ask prices, but volume can
be arbitrary.
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In addition to reducing the target positions for limit order trades, price impact also alters the
rebalancing strategy between these. Recall that price impact increases bid-ask prices after the
liquidity provider has sold the risky asset, and decreases them after purchases. Hence, immediately
starting to trade by market orders to keep the inventory in [β
t
, βt] is not optimal anymore, since this
would more than offset the gains from the previous limit order transactions. To circumvent this, one
can instead focus solely on limit orders, and ensure admissibility by liquidating the portfolio with
market orders and stopping trading altogether if the risky position exits the bigger interval [2β
t
, 2βt].
In the limit for small spreads and frequent limit order executions, the probability for this event
tends to zero, so that the utility loss due to premature liquidation is negligible at the leading order,
and the corresponding policy turns out to be optimal.17
Let us sketch how the arguments from Section 4 can be adapted to derive these results. Again,
construct a frictionless shadow price process S˜t, for which the optimal strategy trades at the same
prices as in the limit order market. Define
S˜t = (1− εt)St− = 1− εt
1− κεtSt if ∆N
(1)
t > 0, and S˜t = (1 + εt)St− =
1 + εt
1 + κεt
St if ∆N
(2)
t > 0,
and assume that the quotient S˜t/St is piecewise constant between the jump time of N
(1)
t , N
(2)
t .
These properties are satisfied by the solution of
dS˜t
S˜t−
= σtdWt + 1A(1)t
((
1 + εt
1− εt (1− κεt)− 1
)
dN
(2)
t − κεt dN (1)t
+
κ− 1
(1− εt)(1− κεt) dεt +
(κ− 1)κ
(1− εt)(1− κεt)2 d〈ε, ε〉t +
(κ− 1)σt
(1− εt)(1− κεt)d〈W, ε〉t
)
+1
A
(2)
t
((
1− εt
1 + εt
(1 + κεt)− 1
)
dN
(1)
t + κεt dN
(2)
t
+
1− κ
(1 + εt)(1 + κεt)
dεt +
(κ− 1)κ
(1 + εt)(1 + κεt)2
d〈ε, ε〉t + (1− κ)σt
(1 + εt)(1 + κεt)
d〈W, ε〉t
)
(5.3)
with S˜0 := (1 + ε0)(1 +κε0)
−1S0. Here, the terms in the second and fourth line of (5.3) ensure that
S˜t coincides with (1− εt)(1−κεt)−1St on A(1)t+ and with (1 + εt)(1 +κεt)−1St on A(2)t+ . For constant
εt these terms disappear. As without price impact, they do anyhow not contribute at the leading
order for ε→ 0.
This frictionless price process matches the execution prices of limit orders in the original limit
order market, as limit orders are executed at their limit prices which are fixed before orders are
executed. However, the corresponding jumps due to price impact – which occur simultaneously with
executions in the limit order market – are only accounted for at the next trade in the frictionless
shadow market. Hence, market orders to manage the investor’s inventory – which naturally consist
of sales after limit order purchases and vice versa – can be carried out at strictly more favorable
price with S˜t. Hence, trading S˜t is generally strictly more favorable than the original limit order
market, and equally favorable only for limit order trades.
As in Section 4.2, one verifies that a risky position that oscillates between β
t
, βt at the jump
times of N
(1)
t , N
(2)
t is optimal at the leading order for S˜t. Similarly as in Section 4.3, one then
checks that the same utility can be obtained in the original limit order market by using the policy
17The same modification could also have been used in the baseline model without price impact. There, however,
the exact optimal strategy keeps the inventory between β
t
, βt by market orders in simple settings [22], so that we
stick to a strategy of that type there.
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proposed above. Indeed, the corresponding limit order trades are executed at the same prices as for
S˜t. For the potential liquidating trade by market orders, there is a single additional loss of order
O(ε2−ϑ) = o(ε2(1−ϑ)), which is negligible at the leading order O(ε2(1−ϑ)). The utility lost due to
terminating trading early is of order O(ε2(1−ϑ)), because it is bounded by its counterpart for S˜t, and
it follows similarly as in the proof of Lemma 4.1 that the probability for a premature termination
tends to zero as ε→ 0. As a result, the total utility loss due to early termination is therefore also
not visible at the leading order O(ε2(1−ϑ)). In summary, the policy proposed above matches the
optimal utility in the superior frictionless market S˜t at the leading order, and is therefore optimal
at the leading order in the original limit order market as well.
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